Endogenous group formation in experimental contests

Arbeitspapier

We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 419

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Endogenous group formation ; contest ; conflict ; alliance ; experiment ; moral hazard problem ; free-riding ; in-group favoritism

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Herbst, Luisa ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Morath, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17245
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93973
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17245-1