Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

Arbeitspapier

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-120/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Antitrust Law ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Cartel ; Antitrust Policy ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust regulation ; Leniency program ; Self-reporting ; repeated game ; Kartell ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Kartellrecht ; Straffreiheit ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Houba, Harold ; Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Wen, Quan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86927
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET