Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

Arbeitspapier

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-120/1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Antitrust Law ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Cartel ; Antitrust Policy ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust regulation ; Leniency program ; Self-reporting ; repeated game ; Kartell ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Kartellrecht ; Straffreiheit ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Houba, Harold ; Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Wen, Quan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86927
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ