Arbeitspapier

Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: I. Buyer Opportunism

We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downwards. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the incumbent to pocket quantity rebates. We show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4873

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
inefficient exclusion
buyer opportunism
disposal costs
quantity rebates
incomplete information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Choné, Philippe
Linnemer, Laurent
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Choné, Philippe
  • Linnemer, Laurent
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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