Arbeitspapier
Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: I. Buyer Opportunism
We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downwards. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the incumbent to pocket quantity rebates. We show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4873
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
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inefficient exclusion
buyer opportunism
disposal costs
quantity rebates
incomplete information
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Choné, Philippe
Linnemer, Laurent
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Choné, Philippe
- Linnemer, Laurent
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014