Bargaining in small dynamic markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies trade in endogenously evolving markets exhibiting few traders at any given point in time. Traders arrive in the market and bargain until they complete a trade. We find that, unlike large markets, small markets feature trade delay and price dispersion, even when sellers and buyers are homogeneous and matching frictions are small. We characterize transaction prices as a function of the endogenous evolution of the market composition and economic conditions, providing several novel comparative statics results. Our analysis highlights the need to incorporate sub-market structures into the theoretical study of job, real estate, and rental markets, where trade opportunities are typically constrained by both the geographical location and individual characteristics of each trader.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 193

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets ; Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
• Thema: Small dynamic markets ; decentralized bargaining ; trade delay

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dilmé, Francesc
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (wo): Bonn and Cologne
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/268026
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ