Does bargaining matter in the small firm matching model?

Arbeitspapier

In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that has been made to implement and systematically compare these solutions in search-matching economies. Our results are twofold. First from the theoretical/methodological viewpoint, we extend a somewhat flexible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable and mathematically tractable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in this context, they are generally qualitatively different and quantitatively weaker than expected. This is of particular relevance in comparison with the results established in the earlier literature.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5181

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Demand and Supply of Labor: General ; Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers: General
• Thema: search and matching models ; bargaining theory ; Nash ; Egalitarian ; Kalai-Smorodinsky ; Klein- und Mittelunternehmen ; Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Nash-Gleichgewicht

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): L'Haridon, Olivier ; Malherbet, Franck ; Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46082
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ