Arbeitspapier
Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9293
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
- Thema
-
intra firm bargaining
Shapley value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brügemann, Björn
Gautier, Pieter A.
Menzio, Guido
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brügemann, Björn
- Gautier, Pieter A.
- Menzio, Guido
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2015