Arbeitspapier

Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9293

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Thema
intra firm bargaining
Shapley value

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brügemann, Björn
Gautier, Pieter A.
Menzio, Guido
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brügemann, Björn
  • Gautier, Pieter A.
  • Menzio, Guido
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)