Arbeitspapier

Bargaining with interdependent values

A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions vanish. When the static incentive constraints preclude first-best efficiency, the limiting bargaining outcome is not second-best efficient and may even perform worse than the outcome from the one-period bargaining game. With frequent buyer offers, the outcome is then characterized by recurring bursts of high probability of agreement, followed by long periods of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Research Report ; No. 2001-7

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Marktmechanismus
Verhandlungstheorie
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Deneckere, Raymond
Liang, Meng-Yu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
(wo)
London (Ontario)
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Deneckere, Raymond
  • Liang, Meng-Yu
  • The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2001

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