Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

Arbeitspapier

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a general social choice setting that allows for informationally interdependent valuations and for allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multi-dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by a complex integrability constraint, and it can hold only in non-generic cases such as the private value case or the symmetric case. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied. We apply the results to the study of multi-object auctions, and we discuss why such auctions cannot be reduced to one-dimensional models without loss of generality.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1244

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jehiel, Philippe ; Moldovanu, Benny
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221600
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET