Bargaining in Collusive Markets

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we investigate collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly where firms have different discount factors. In order to study how a collusive agreement is reached we model the equilibrium selection as an alternating-offer bargaining game. The selected equilibrium has several appealing features: First, it is efficient in the sense that it entails immediate agreement on the monopoly price. Second, the equilibrium shows how discount factors affect equilibrium market shares. A comparative statics analysis on equilibrium market shares reveals that changes in discount factors may have ambiguous effects on market shares.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006:21

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: Bargaining ; different discount factors ; explicit collusion ; market shares

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andersson, Ola
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259934
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ