Ordered Bargaining

Arbeitspapier

When buyers choose the order in which they bargain with suppliers of known characteristics, prices are determined jointly by bargaining power and competitive intensity (the outside option to bargain with rival suppliers). Bargaining power becomes less important to the outcome as competition intensifies; prices fall to marginal cost in the limit. With positive visit costs and weak competition, some buyer power is necessary for trade. Incomplete buyer power may lead to inefficient choice of bargaining order. The robustness of ordered bargaining to the possibility of price posting and auctions, and welfare properties of these alternative pricing institutions are also explored.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 06-10

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Raskovich, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
• (wo): Washington, DC
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202349
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ