Restricted Coasean Bargaining

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the externality, we show an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions. For cases where the restrictions are contested, we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 12/156

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: Coase theorem ; bargaining restrictions ; appropriation ; Coase-Theorem ; Pareto-Optimum ; Externer Effekt ; Verhandlungstheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): MacKenzie, Ian A. ; Ohndorf, Markus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006832410
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171599
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ