Arbeitspapier
The Bargaining Trap
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a "trap," where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein's example of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9903
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
alternating offers
bargaining
time preferences
haggling costs
outside options
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022