Arbeitspapier
Bargaining and voting
Government by majority rule voting requires that compromise be attainable, but not too easily. Little of the nation's business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and political parties to strike bargains, but government by majority rule voting could not withstand a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Democratic government is designed to foster bargaining where it should be fostered and to impede bargaining where it should be impeded.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1245
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- Subject
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Bargaining
Majority rule voting
Wahlverhalten
Wahlsystem
Verhandlungsmacht
Demokratie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Usher, Dan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Usher, Dan
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
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