Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: A characterization

Arbeitspapier

We examine the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.´s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2016-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: legislative bargaining ; weighted voting ; proportional payoffs

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Montero, Maria
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163003
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET