Arbeitspapier

Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: A characterization

We examine the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.´s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2016-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
legislative bargaining
weighted voting
proportional payoffs

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Montero, Maria
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(where)
Nottingham
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Montero, Maria
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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