Arbeitspapier

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining - A Dynamic Perspective

We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues, and ii) labour markets are subject to a static inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, under broad assumptions the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero-capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 836

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
optimal taxation
imperfectly competitive labour markets
capital accumulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koskela, Erkki
von Thadden, Leopold
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koskela, Erkki
  • von Thadden, Leopold
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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