Arbeitspapier

Capital Structure, Wage Bargaining and Employment

We offer a unified framework to analyze the determination of employment, employee effort, wages, profit-sharing and capital structure when firms face stochastic revenue shocks. We apply a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which extends the wage bargaining literature by incorporating efficiency wage considerations, profit-sharing and capital structure. The profit-sharing instrument is demonstrated to have positive effort-augmenting and wage-moderating effects, which exactly offset the negative dilution effect in equilibrium. Leverage is shown to decrease employment and to have a strategic commitment value as a wage-moderating effect for firms facing unions in bilateral wage negotiations. Finally, some implications for equilibrium unemployment are characterized.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 275

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Wage bargaining
profit sharing
capital structure
employment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Koskela, Erkki
Stenbacka, Rune
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Koskela, Erkki
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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