Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

Artikel

n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 137-153 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
• Subject: cost sharing ; pollutant-cleaning cost ; water taxes

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gómez-Rúa, María
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Springer
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77748
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET