Arbeitspapier

River sharing and water trade

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2012

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Thema
River Sharing
Water Trade
Market Emergence
Property Rights
Coalition Stability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ansink, Erik
Gengenbach, Michael
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ansink, Erik
  • Gengenbach, Michael
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)