River sharing and water trade

Arbeitspapier

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
• Subject: River Sharing ; Water Trade ; Market Emergence ; Property Rights ; Coalition Stability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ansink, Erik ; Gengenbach, Michael ; Weikard, Hans-Peter
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET