River Sharing and Water Trade

Konferenzbeitrag

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Game Theory ; No. E15-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Capitalist Systems: Property Rights

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Ansink, Erik ; Gengenbach, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79931
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET