Arbeitspapier
River Sharing and Water Trade
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water while other agents can take some of the river water that passes their territory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-001/VIII
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Noncooperative Games
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Thema
-
river sharing
water trade
market emergence
property rights
coalition stability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ansink, Erik
Gengenbach, Michael
Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ansink, Erik
- Gengenbach, Michael
- Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2015
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