Arbeitspapier

Raising taxes through equalization

A simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates, distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers. To test this, I examine Canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972-2002 period. Consistent with the theory, provinces respond to expansions of equalization transfers by increasing their own tax rates. I estimate that on average tax rates in grant-receiving provinces were substantially and significantly higher as a consequence of the transfer formula.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1926

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Subject
Ländersteuer
Steuertarif
Steuerpolitik
Finanzausgleich
Finanzföderalismus
Schätzung
Kanada

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Smart, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Smart, Michael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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