Arbeitspapier
Raising rivals' costs through buyer power
We re-examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms' profits and the uniform input price. Assuming different input efficiencies among downstream firms, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition such that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms. In such instances, consumers may be better off if discriminatory pricing is feasible.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-161-8
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 162
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Labor Law
- Thema
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Price discrimination
Buyer Power
Raising Rivals’ Costs
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Haucap, Justus
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
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Düsseldorf
- (wann)
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2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Haucap, Justus
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2014