Arbeitspapier
Raising juveniles
This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme, in which the parents can enforce a particular level of schooling by employing a monitoring technology; and the cooperative solution, in which the threat point is one of the two noncooperative outcomes. Adults choose which game is played. While the subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game is Pareto-efficient when viewed statically, it may yield less education than the hierarchical scheme. Regulation in the form of restrictions on child labor and compulsory schooling generally affects both the threat point and the feasible set of bargaining outcomes, and families may choose more schooling than the minimum required by law.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5036
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- Thema
-
Family decision-making
youth
human capital
bargaining
Kinderbetreuung
Pädagogik
Familienökonomik
Verhandlungstheorie
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bell, Clive
Gersbach, Hans
Schneider, Maik T.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bell, Clive
- Gersbach, Hans
- Schneider, Maik T.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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