Arbeitspapier
Testing forbearance experimentally: Duopolistic competition of conglomerate firms
Like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,043
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Experiment
Forbearance
Competition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Häger, Kirsten
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Schwalbach, Joachim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Häger, Kirsten
- Kirchkamp, Oliver
- Schwalbach, Joachim
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010