Arbeitspapier

Testing forbearance experimentally: Duopolistic competition of conglomerate firms

Like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,043

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
Experiment
Forbearance
Competition

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Häger, Kirsten
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Schwalbach, Joachim
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Häger, Kirsten
  • Kirchkamp, Oliver
  • Schwalbach, Joachim
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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