Uncertainty and International Negotiations on Tradable Quota Treaties

Arbeitspapier

Negotiating an international tradable quota treaty between industrialised and developing countries is complicated by uncertain marginal abatement costs and non-uniform quota prices. An initial quota allocation that implies zero expected net cost to developing countries will typically be insufficient to attract their participation in the treaty. Two options to compensate for uncertainty are discussed here, extra emissions quotas and financial transfers. The latter is found to be more effective in facilitating treaty-making, but the scope of co-operation is restricted by the developing countries' risk-aversion.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 233

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
• Subject: Tradable quotas ; uncertainty

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Søberg, Morten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192216
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET