Arbeitspapier
Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes
If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries' behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower, treaties typically fail to help countries cooperate to avoid catastrophe, sustaining only modest cuts in emissions. These results are unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of catastrophe. By contrast, uncertainty about the catastrophic threshold typically causes coordination to collapse. Whether the probability density function has thin or fat tails makes little difference.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4024
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
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catastrophe
uncertainty
thresholds
impacts
coordination
cooperation
international
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Barrett, Scott
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
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2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Barrett, Scott
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2012