Arbeitspapier

Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes

If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries' behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower, treaties typically fail to help countries cooperate to avoid catastrophe, sustaining only modest cuts in emissions. These results are unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of catastrophe. By contrast, uncertainty about the catastrophic threshold typically causes coordination to collapse. Whether the probability density function has thin or fat tails makes little difference.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4024

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Thema
catastrophe
uncertainty
thresholds
impacts
coordination
cooperation
international

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Barrett, Scott
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Barrett, Scott
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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