Arbeitspapier
Climate treaties and backstop technologies
In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs and a backstop technology ('air capture') with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on situations in which countries can gain collectively by using both technologies. I show that, under some circumstances, countries will be better off negotiating treaties that are not cost-effective. When countries prefer to negotiate self-enforcing agreements that are cost-effective, the availability of the backstop technology causes cooperation in abatement to increase significantly.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
Klimaschutz
Umweltabkommen
Anreizvertrag
Luftreinhaltung
Umwelttechnik
Umweltschutzkosten
Grenzkosten
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Barrett, Scott
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Barrett, Scott
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010