Arbeitspapier

Sustainable Climate Treaties

We examine long-run treaties for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in this period suitably rescaled by a weighting factor. We show that a suitably selected refunding scheme implements the globally optimal reductions of greenhouse gases in all periods as a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The country-specific initial fees can be chosen to engineer a Pareto improvement and to ease participation. We also show that any planned abatement path as e.g. the one envisioned by the Paris Agreement in 2015 can be implemented by an appropriately chosen refunding scheme. Finally, we suggest ways for countries to raise money for the payment of initial fees that are neutral to tax payers and international capital markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6385

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Public Goods
Thema
climate change mitigation
refunding scheme
international agreements
sustainable treaty

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gersbach, Hans
Hummel, Noemi
Winkler, Ralph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Hummel, Noemi
  • Winkler, Ralph
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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