Arbeitspapier
Sustainable Climate Treaties
We examine long-run treaties for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in this period suitably rescaled by a weighting factor. We show that a suitably selected refunding scheme implements the globally optimal reductions of greenhouse gases in all periods as a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The country-specific initial fees can be chosen to engineer a Pareto improvement and to ease participation. We also show that any planned abatement path as e.g. the one envisioned by the Paris Agreement in 2015 can be implemented by an appropriately chosen refunding scheme. Finally, we suggest ways for countries to raise money for the payment of initial fees that are neutral to tax payers and international capital markets.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6385
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Public Goods
- Thema
-
climate change mitigation
refunding scheme
international agreements
sustainable treaty
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Hummel, Noemi
Winkler, Ralph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Hummel, Noemi
- Winkler, Ralph
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017