Uncertainty and International Negotiations on Tradable Quota Treaties

Arbeitspapier

Negotiating an international tradable quota treaty between industrialised and developing countries is complicated by uncertain marginal abatement costs and non-uniform quota prices. An initial quota allocation that implies zero expected net cost to developing countries will typically be insufficient to attract their participation in the treaty. Two options to compensate for uncertainty are discussed here, extra emissions quotas and financial transfers. The latter is found to be more effective in facilitating treaty-making, but the scope of co-operation is restricted by the developing countries' risk-aversion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 233

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
• Thema: Tradable quotas ; uncertainty

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Søberg, Morten
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192216
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ