Arbeitspapier

Contests Among Bureaucrats

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 807

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
bureaucracy
lobbying
contests

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bös, Dieter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bös, Dieter
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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