Arbeitspapier
Contests Among Bureaucrats
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 807
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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bureaucracy
lobbying
contests
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bös, Dieter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bös, Dieter
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2002