Arbeitspapier
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4511
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
bureaucracy
fixed budgets
power of incentives
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Khalil, Fahad
Kim, Doyoung
Lawarrée, Jacques
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Khalil, Fahad
- Kim, Doyoung
- Lawarrée, Jacques
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?
Flexible contracts
Bait contracts
Commitment contracts
General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy
Endogenizing private information: Incentive contracts under learning by doing
How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?
Flexible contracts
Bait contracts
Commitment contracts
General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy
Endogenizing private information: Incentive contracts under learning by doing
How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Review and Assessment of Programs Offered by State Universities and Colleges
Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?
Flexible contracts
Bait contracts
Commitment contracts
General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy