Artikel
How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 305-323 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
health plans competition
adverse selection
differentiation
Private Krankenversicherung
Adverse Selektion
Asymmetrische Information
Versicherungsökonomik
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Olivella, Pau
Vera-Hernandez, Marcos
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.1007/s13209-010-0026-3
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Olivella, Pau
- Vera-Hernandez, Marcos
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2010
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