Bait contracts

Arbeitspapier

The granting of stock options to employees who have negligible impact on company performance intuitively violates Holmstrom's (1979) sufficient statistic result. This paper revisits the sufficient statistic question of when to condition a contract on an outside signal in a principal-agent model in which I introduce imprecise (or vague) information. The paper applies a choice theoretic framework introduced in Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) and extended by Viero (2009a), who denoted it vague environments. I show that if the signal is vague, Holmstrom's result can be overturned.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1212

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Production and Organizations: General ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Thema: contracts ; vagueness ; optimism ; incentives ; signals ; stock options ; Arbeitskräfte ; Aktienoption ; Vertragstheorie ; Unvollkommene Information ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Vierø, Marie-Louise
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Kingston (Ontario)
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67769
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ