Arbeitspapier

Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-096/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Auctions
Thema
rent seeking
corruption
selection of officials
quasi-auction
sale of jobs
Rent-Seeking
Öffentlicher Dienst
Korruption
Lohnniveau
Personalauswahl
Auktionstheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hu, Audrey
Zhou, Liang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hu, Audrey
  • Zhou, Liang
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2007

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