Arbeitspapier
Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats
A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-096/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Auctions
- Subject
-
rent seeking
corruption
selection of officials
quasi-auction
sale of jobs
Rent-Seeking
Öffentlicher Dienst
Korruption
Lohnniveau
Personalauswahl
Auktionstheorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hu, Audrey
Zhou, Liang
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hu, Audrey
- Zhou, Liang
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2007
Other Objects (12)
Informal Sector in Developed and less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Why less? The Gendered Aspects of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) Ownership under Economic Transition
Are Workers with A Long Commute Less Productive? An Empirical Analysis of Absenteeism
Less School (Costs), More (Female) Education? Lessons from Egypt Reducing Years of Compulsory Schooling
Why the Rich drink more but smoke less: The Impact of Wealth on Health Behaviors
Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 make Firms less Opaque? Evidence from Analyst Earnings Forecasts
Do Negative Interest Rates Make Banks Less Safe?
Will Islamic Banking make the World less risky? An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure, Risk Shifting and Financial Stability
Measures of Fit for Multinomial Discrete Models
Elements of the Theory of Extrema
Second-Best Congestion Pricing in General Static Transportation Networks with Elastic Demand
Informal Sector in Developed and less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Why less? The Gendered Aspects of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) Ownership under Economic Transition
Are Workers with A Long Commute Less Productive? An Empirical Analysis of Absenteeism
Less School (Costs), More (Female) Education? Lessons from Egypt Reducing Years of Compulsory Schooling
Why the Rich drink more but smoke less: The Impact of Wealth on Health Behaviors
Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 make Firms less Opaque? Evidence from Analyst Earnings Forecasts
Do Negative Interest Rates Make Banks Less Safe?
Will Islamic Banking make the World less risky? An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure, Risk Shifting and Financial Stability
Measures of Fit for Multinomial Discrete Models
Elements of the Theory of Extrema
Second-Best Congestion Pricing in General Static Transportation Networks with Elastic Demand
Informal Sector in Developed and less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Farmers: Less Asymmetric Information and More Trader Competition?
Why less? The Gendered Aspects of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) Ownership under Economic Transition
Are Workers with A Long Commute Less Productive? An Empirical Analysis of Absenteeism
Less School (Costs), More (Female) Education? Lessons from Egypt Reducing Years of Compulsory Schooling
Why the Rich drink more but smoke less: The Impact of Wealth on Health Behaviors
Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 make Firms less Opaque? Evidence from Analyst Earnings Forecasts
Do Negative Interest Rates Make Banks Less Safe?
Will Islamic Banking make the World less risky? An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure, Risk Shifting and Financial Stability
Measures of Fit for Multinomial Discrete Models
Elements of the Theory of Extrema