Arbeitspapier

Contests Among Bureaucrats

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 27/2002

Classification: Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

Subject: Bureaucracy
Lobbying
Contests
Bürokratietheorie
Budgetkreislauf
Wettbewerb
Besoldung
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Bös, Dieter

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

(where): Bonn

(when): 2002

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Bös, Dieter
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

2002

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Arbeitspapier