Arbeitspapier
Merger in Contests
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 241
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Contests
merger
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Konrad, Kai A.
Müller, Wieland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Müller, Wieland
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000
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