Outsourcing in contests

Arbeitspapier

We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, unless the ex-post bargaining strength of the contest winner is sufficiently low and/or there are very few contestants. However, even in the case of two contestants, outsourcing reduces the procurement costs of inducing a given level of effort if the contest organizer can collect entry fees. With respect to contest design, this suggests that outsourcing should generally be allowed if the objective is to induce stronger competition.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1658

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing ; Organization of Production ; Auctions
• Thema: contests ; outsourcing ; bargaining ; contest design ; Outsourcing ; Ausschreibung ; Wettbewerb ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Forschung ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Meland, Frode ; Straume, Odd Rune
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19122
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ