Contests Among Bureaucrats

Arbeitspapier

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 27/2002

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Thema: Bureaucracy ; Lobbying ; Contests ; Bürokratietheorie ; Budgetkreislauf ; Wettbewerb ; Besoldung ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bös, Dieter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ