Arbeitspapier

Bureaucrats as successor CEOs

Chinese companies sometimes appoint a government official (bureaucrat) as CEO on the expectation of benefiting from the political connections of the new hire. Based on a sample of 2,454 CEO transitions our empirical findings are consistent with the implications of a simple contract model in oligopolistic markets. Firms that appoint a bureaucrat as CEO obtain more credit and subsidies. They have positive abnormal announcement returns, negative abnormal long-run returns and larger variance of long-run returns. Furthermore, they experience a deterioration in operating performances, increased rent-seeking behavior of the management and weakening of corporate governance. The results from the split share structure reform in 2005 corroborate the supportive findings for the preferential treatment hypothesis.

ISBN
978-952-323-129-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2016

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
New Firms; Startups

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dang, Tri Vi
He, Qing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dang, Tri Vi
  • He, Qing
  • Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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