Arbeitspapier
Strategy-proofness of stochastic assignment mechanisms
This paper compares two prominent stochastic assignment mechanisms in the laboratory: Random serial dictatorship (RSD) and top trading cycles with random endowments (TTC). In standard theory, both mechanisms are strategy-proof and Pareto-effcient for the house allocation problem without endowments. In the experiment, RSD outperforms TTC. This can be attributed to more dominant strategy play under RSD. The behavioral theory of obvious strategy-proofness can partly explain this difference in dominant strategy play. Generally, subjects with extremely high and low levels of contingent reasoning play their dominant strategies. These results suggest that one strategy-proof mechanism may outperform another one if individuals are boundedly rational.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2017/13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
market design
mechanism design
randomization
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmelzer, André
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmelzer, André
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Optimal Stochastic Development Strategy
The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
Stochastic User Equilibrium Traffic Assignment with Price-sensitive Demand: Do Methods matter (much)?
Assignment maximization
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Optimal Stochastic Development Strategy
The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
Stochastic User Equilibrium Traffic Assignment with Price-sensitive Demand: Do Methods matter (much)?
Assignment maximization
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
Optimal Stochastic Development Strategy
The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
Stochastic User Equilibrium Traffic Assignment with Price-sensitive Demand: Do Methods matter (much)?