Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences

Arbeitspapier

Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects. This paper is to investigate the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules in such environments. A preference relation is single demand if an agent wishes to receive at most one object; it is multi demand if whenever an agent receives one object, an additional object makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains all the single demand preferences and at least one multi demand preference relation, and there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 943

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: strategy-proofness ; efficiency ; multi demand preferences ; single demand preferences ; non-quasi-linear preferences ; minimum price Walrasian rule

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kazumura, Tomoya ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127113
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET