Arbeitspapier
Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 74
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
Labor Contracts
Firm Behavior: Theory
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Economies of scope
free-rider effect
mismatch
teams
tournament
Wettbewerb
Markteintritt
Vertragstheorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
Tournament
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 1999
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Strategic data sales to competing firms
Moral hazard and cooperation in competing teams
Strategic Learning in Teams
Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence
Competing Transport Networks
Competing for attention
Competing risks models
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Performance in the beauty contest: How strategic discussion enhances team reasoning
Structurally Dependent Competing Risks
Non-competing data intermediaries
Strategic data sales to competing firms
Moral hazard and cooperation in competing teams
Strategic Learning in Teams
Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence
Competing Transport Networks
Competing for attention
Competing risks models
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Performance in the beauty contest: How strategic discussion enhances team reasoning
Structurally Dependent Competing Risks
Non-competing data intermediaries
Strategic data sales to competing firms
Moral hazard and cooperation in competing teams
Strategic Learning in Teams
Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence
Competing Transport Networks
Competing for attention
Competing risks models
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
Performance in the beauty contest: How strategic discussion enhances team reasoning
Structurally Dependent Competing Risks