Strategic Learning in Teams

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms' yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the types of the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated. I show that the efficient policy is incentive-compatible if, and only if, the stakes are high enough. Moreover, learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value functions if, and only if, the stakes exceed a certain threshold.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 333

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Thema: Strategic Experimentation ; Three-Armed Bandit ; Exponential Distribution ; Poisson Process ; Bayesian Learning ; Markov Perfect Equilibrium ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Arbeitsgruppe ; Lernprozess ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Gleichgewicht ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Klein, Nicolas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13221
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93808
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13221-7
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ