Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents' performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the "best-shot technology"), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers, in which case no feedback is best. If, on the other hand, team performance is determined by the worst performer (the weakest-link technology), then no feedback is the best regime unless the team is composed of all high performers, in which case public or private feedback is better. Our results have implications for performance feedback policies in educational settings and the workplace.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 1714

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management
• Thema: Lab experiments ; Feedback ; Performance feedback ; Teams ; Strategic communication ; Disclosure games ; Multiple audiences

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ertaç, Seda ; Gümren, Mert ; Koçkesen, Levent
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
• (wo): Istanbul
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202968
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ