Arbeitspapier
Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems: theory and experimental evidence
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3111
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Tournament
commitment problems
feedback
experiment
Agency Theory
Informationsverhalten
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gürtler, Oliver
Harbring, Christine
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
28.03.2025, 2:42 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gürtler, Oliver
- Harbring, Christine
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2007
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Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability
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