Arbeitspapier

Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems: theory and experimental evidence

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3111

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Tournament
commitment problems
feedback
experiment
Agency Theory
Informationsverhalten
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gürtler, Oliver
Harbring, Christine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gürtler, Oliver
  • Harbring, Christine
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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