Arbeitspapier
Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems: theory and experimental evidence
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3111
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Tournament
commitment problems
feedback
experiment
Agency Theory
Informationsverhalten
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gürtler, Oliver
Harbring, Christine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gürtler, Oliver
- Harbring, Christine
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2007
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