Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 219

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: tournament ; commitment problems ; feedback ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gürtler, Oliver ; Harbring, Christine
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2007

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13333
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93989
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13333-9
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET