Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 219

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: tournament ; commitment problems ; feedback ; experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gürtler, Oliver ; Harbring, Christine
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13333
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93989
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13333-9
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ