Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games

Arbeitspapier

We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2010-02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Thema: Strategic sophistication ; beliefs ; experiment ; team decision making ; individual decision making ; Normalformspiel ; Spieltheorie ; Entscheidung ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Test ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sutter, Matthias ; Czermak, Simon ; Feri, Francesco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (wo): Innsbruck
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73504
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ